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2.1 Introduction
Education is currently at the forefront of the nation’s political agenda:
Everyone, regardless of political persuasion, wants to see an improvement
in American schools’ performance. Everyone does not support an increase
in governments’ (federal, state, or local) education budgets, however. In the
current climate, in which many state and local governments face ﬁnancial
constraints but many voters are demanding tangible evidence of school im-
provement, policies that increase school choice through the use of vouchers
have become increasingly popular.
Many economists ﬁnd vouchers appealing because they increase school-
ing options for families whose choices might otherwise be constrained (by
low incomes, job location, residential segregation, etc.). If parents are well
informed then vouchers will increase eﬃciency by increasing families’ abil-
ities to sort into optimal schools. At the same time, vouchers are expected
to improve average school quality by increasing competition among
schools. When a student uses a voucher to attend a private school, the local
public school’s funding is decreased by the amount of the voucher, and this
threat of budget cuts will provide schools with an incentive to improve. The
larger the number of voucher-eligible students in a school, the more incen-
tive the school has to improve performance.
Recent voucher proposals have also been justiﬁed on the grounds that
students should be provided a means of exiting low-quality schools so that
they do not experience failure. A voucher program built around this prem-
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school regardless of whether they are economically constrained. Econo-
mists are typically less comfortable with this type of program because (a) it
suggests that the state is better than parents at assessing school quality, and
(b) it is unclear why vouchers would lead to better schooling choices among
parents who are not liquidity constrained yet voluntarily select low-quality
schools. An advantage of this type of program, however, is that failing
schools face the prospect of losing all of their students (not just the eco-
nomically disadvantaged ones), which presumably provides a strong incen-
tive to improve.
School accountability is an alternative policy that aims to improve school
quality without increasing costs. Accountability systems reward and pun-
ish schools by allocating funding according to whether the school meets
certain performance criteria. When vouchers are targeted toward econom-
ically disadvantaged children, the performance measures created by an ac-
countability system provide information that helps parents optimize. Many
states have some form of school choice that coexists with a system of grad-
ing schools.1 Currently popular, however, is the idea of integrating school
choice and accountability so that students attending schools that the state
has identiﬁed as failing have the option of moving elsewhere. Florida has re-
cently adopted an integrated accountability/voucher program, and Presi-
dent Bush proposed such an initiative as part of his national accountability-
based education plan. Although private school vouchers are excluded from
the federal law that eventually passed, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001
integrates increased public school choice into a national school accounta-
bility system.
The purpose of this paper is to identify which students would be eligible
for a voucher under diﬀerent types of voucher programs. We use data from
the state of Florida and pay particular attention to the distributional im-
pact of vouchers targeted toward disadvantaged students versus the dis-
tributional impact of vouchers targeted toward students attending low-
performing schools. Although at ﬁrst one might expect these two types of
targeting schemes to reach approximately the same students, in fact the ex-
tent to which this is true will depend on the distribution of children across
schools and on the way in which a school’s performance is measured. As we
will discuss in the next two sections, there are many diﬀerent ways of evalu-
ating a school’s performance. Our results suggest that the performance cri-
teria that may seem most appropriate from an accountability perspective
may not do the best job of targeting economically and socially disadvan-
taged children. In fact, a voucher system that uses value-added measures of
performance to determine voucher awards may do little better in achieving
this goal than a system that randomly assigns vouchers. Thus, although
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1. States include Arizona, California, Minnesota, Michigan, and North Carolina.vouchers and accountability programs have similar goals, economists’ jus-
tiﬁcations for vouchers may be undermined when vouchers are integrated
with accountability.
In the remainder of this paper we describe our data and the voucher pro-
gram in Florida. We then compare the stratiﬁcation eﬀects of targeting
vouchers using family income to the stratiﬁcation eﬀects of targeting vouch-
ers using school characteristics, including the types of performance mea-
sures being adopted in Florida and proposed by President Bush. In the ﬁ-
nal section, we discuss our results’ implications.
2.2 Vouchers and Accountability in Florida
Our eligibility simulations are based on aggregated student-level data pro-
vided by the state of Florida’s Department of Education for the 1998–1999
and 1999–2000 school years. The data include information on every public
school student’s race or ethnicity, test scores, free or reduced-price lunch el-
igibility, and school attended. Florida is one of the only states that has col-
lected detailed enough information for our project to be pursued. An ad-
vantage of using these data is that our simulations can speak directly to the
one state that currently has an integrated voucher/accountability program.
Our ﬁndings will be relevant beyond Florida, however. The idea of imbed-
ding a voucher program within an accountability system is attractive to
many state legislators and has been proposed by President Bush. Although
the magnitude of the eﬀects will diﬀer across states depending on the distri-
bution of students across schools and the degree to which accountability
and vouchers are linked, the general patterns should be the same.2
2.2.1 Overview of the Florida Program
School accountability in Florida is based on student performance on the
Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT). Students in Florida are
given reading examinations and the Florida Writes! exam in fourth, eighth,
and tenth grade, and they are given mathematics examinations in ﬁfth,
eighth, and tenth grade. Test scores are then converted into a ﬁve- or six-
point scale, which is used to assign a letter grade ranging from “A” through
“F.” In order to attain a “C” grade, at least 60 percent of the school’s test-
takers must achieve at level two or above (on the ﬁve-point scale) in reading
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2. The generalizability of our results rests largely on whether low-income and minority stu-
dents are similarly distributed across schools in other states. We used the 1996–97 Common
Core of Data to look at how the distribution of students in Florida compared to the distribu-
tion of students in California and Texas (since these are two large states). Minorities in Cali-
fornia and Texas are more concentrated than in Florida. For example, in California, 75 per-
cent of minorities attend schools that are at least 58 percent minority, in Texas 75 percent of
minorities attend schools that are at least 52 percent minority, and in Florida 75 percent of mi-
norities attend schools that are at least 37 percent minority. Similar, although less dramatic,
patterns exist with respect to the concentration of poverty.and math, and at least 50 percent of test-takers must achieve at level three
or above (on a six-point scale) on the Florida Writes! examination.3 If a
school misses one or two of these thresholds it receives a grade of “D.” If it
misses all three of these thresholds it receives a grade of “F.” The ﬁrst as-
signment of school letter grades occurred in May 1999, and about 8 percent
of schools receiving grades4 earned grades of “A,” whereas 13, 51, and 25
percent received grades of “B,” “C,” and “D,” respectively. Just over 3 per-
cent of schools were graded “F.”5
Letter grades aﬀect schools on both ends of the spectrum: Those who re-
ceive an “A” grade, or who increase their letter grades from one year to the
next, are eligible to receive an additional $100 per pupil. On the other hand,
students attending schools that are rated “F” in two years out of four are el-
igible for “opportunity scholarships” that can be used to attend private
school or nearby public schools with ratings of “C” or higher. Students who
choose to transfer may remain in their school of choice until the terminal
grade of that school, regardless of whether their initial school improves in
subsequent years. Although the Florida plan currently bases school grades,
and, thus, voucher eligibility, on aggregate levels of test performance, its ar-
chitects viewed level test scores as only an interim metric for grading per-
formance. The accountability law requires that by the 2002–03 academic
year school grades be based, at least in part, on value added measures of
student performance. President Bush’s proposal also relied on value added
performance measures to determine voucher eligibility. Although the spe-
ciﬁc nature of value added school assessment is still under deliberation in
Florida, it is clear that school grades will soon be based in large measure on
features other than levels of aggregate student performance.
Florida’s grading system is complicated, but when schools are ranked us-
ing these grading criteria, their ordering is very similar to the ordering that
emerges if average math performance or average reading performance is
used to order schools instead. The correlation between a school’s ranking
determined using Florida’s current criteria and a school’s ranking based on
average test scores is about 0.95. On the other hand, correlations between
school rankings that are based on single-year measures of school perfor-
mance and the rankings that emerge when within-cohort test score growth
(value added) is used instead are close to zero.6 These low correlations in
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3. These levels were determined by the Florida Department of Education, based on expert
opinion on how well students satisﬁed the “Sunshine State Standards” for the appropriate
grade.
4. Schools did not receive letter grades if their tested cohorts were suﬃciently small.
5. “A” and “B” grades in Florida are based on cross-cohort changes in test scores, as well as
diﬀerences in attendance, suspension, and test-taking rates.
6. The correlation between a school’s position based on its average reading score in a par-
ticular year and its rank when ordering is based on within-cohort changes in average reading
scores from one year to the next, for example, is only 0.05. Currently, we can only make this
comparison using reading test scores because 1999–2000 was the ﬁrst year that the state testedturn hint that when vouchers are embedded within an accountability sys-
tem, the types of students who qualify for vouchers may vary a great deal
with the type of performance measure that is used. The purpose of the next
section is to determine how important the choice of performance criteria is.
2.3 Who Is Eligible for a Targeted Voucher?
We begin by looking at the socioeconomic composition of the choice-
eligible population when voucher eligibility is determined using school-
level attributes. Next, we turn our attention toward understanding the ram-
iﬁcations of school-based accountability/voucher systems. In all of the
simulations we assume that the amount of the school voucher would remain
the same as it currently is in Florida—that is, full payment of tuition and
fees by the student’s private school of choice. Eligibility is, of course, not
aﬀected by this assumption, although take-up rates will strongly depend on
the amount of the voucher.
As a point of comparison, the ﬁrst column of table 2.1 provides informa-
tion about the demographic characteristics of the student population in
Florida. This column tells us that if vouchers were made universally avail-
able, then approximately 26 percent of recipients would be black, 18 per-
cent would be Hispanic, and 44 percent would be eligible for a free lunch.
We have standardized Florida’s test scores, so the average test score for the
sample is close to zero.7
2.3.1 Voucher Eligibility Based on Socioeconomic Status
Although universal vouchers have been proposed by some policymakers
(indeed, California’s recent voucher initiative would have made vouchers
available to all students), those programs that are actually implemented are
likely to be targeted toward speciﬁc subsets of the student population. Mil-
waukee’s voucher program is probably the best known, and so our ﬁrst step
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in every grade from three through ten. Therefore, although we could construct a student-level
test score change in reading from grade four to grade ﬁve this year, we have to wait until next
year before a similar exercise can be conducted in mathematics, because historically, reading
has been tested in fourth grade and mathematics in ﬁfth grade. None of the rankings that
emerge using diﬀerent performance measures are very correlated with school spending at the
district level. Using expenditures reported by the Florida Department of Education for 1998–
99, we ﬁnd a correlation between per-pupil district spending and a school’s average reading
score of –0.14. We estimate the same correlation between per-pupil district spending and a
school’s average math score. This result is unsurprising given that higher-spending districts
tend to be located in urban areas, where costs are higher. Correlations between per-pupil ex-
penditures and any of the value added measures we use in this paper range from 0.01 to 0.06.
It should be noted, however, that relative to many states Florida has a ﬂat spending distribu-
tion. The 95:5 ratio in spending is only 1.2.
7. The mean is not precisely zero because a small number of eligible test-takers are not part
of the accountability system (because of small school size) but were still used to standardize
the test for basis of comparison. The decision to include or exclude these test-takers from the



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.is to replicate the eligibility criterion used in that program. In Milwaukee,
students with family incomes below 175 percent of the poverty line are eli-
gible to receive a voucher. We do not have explicit information on students’
income, but we can look at how stratiﬁcation is aﬀected when vouchers are
targeted to students who are eligible for free or reduced-price lunches. The
income cutoﬀs for free and reduced-price lunch eligibility are close to Mil-
waukee’s threshold: The free lunch eligibility cutoﬀ is 130 percent of the
poverty line, and the reduced-price lunch threshold is 185 percent of the
poverty line.
The second two columns in table 2.1 present the characteristics of stu-
dents eligible for free (or free and reduced-price) lunches in Florida. If every
free lunch–eligible student were to receive a voucher, then 44 percent of the
state’s student body would be voucher-eligible. If the eligibility threshold
were increased to include students eligible for reduced-price lunches, cov-
erage would rise to 53 percent. Free lunch–eligible students are dispro-
portionately minorities (primarily black) and disproportionately reside in
low-income neighborhoods.8 By definition, all of these students have low
incomes. In addition, because low-income students in Florida, as in the rest
of the country, tend to have lower test scores than high-income students, the
average test score of the voucher-eligible population would be around six-
tenths of a standard deviation below the state mean.
It is important to remember that in practice no voucher programs have
targeted such a high fraction of students. In Milwaukee, for example,
roughly half of the students are eligible, but only 15 percent are allowed to
participate. Voucher assignment in Milwaukee is determined by lottery. If
recipients in Florida were to be randomly selected from the income-eligible
population, then although the number of served students would be lower
than 44 percent, the distribution of their characteristics would still look
much as it does in column (2).
If poverty is highly concentrated, then a disadvantage of targeting vouch-
ers according to family income is that they may not increase competition
among very many schools. As in the rest of the country, poverty in Florida
is not evenly distributed across schools, but providing vouchers to every free
lunch–eligible student could still signiﬁcantly aﬀect the level of resources
available to schools. Fourteen percent of Florida’s elementary schools have
75 percent or more students eligible for free lunches, and 44 percent of
schools are at least half free lunch eligible. If voucher recipients were drawn
at random from the eligible population (as in Milwaukee), then a smaller
number of students would ultimately receive a voucher, and competition
would be lessened.
An alternative method of delivering vouchers to disadvantaged students
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8. We deﬁne a low-income neighborhood as a zip code ranking in the top quarter statewide
(weighted by school-aged population) of percentage of children in poverty.is to base voucher eligibility on the poverty status of the school to which
they are assigned. The fourth through eighth columns of table 2.1 oﬀer the
demographic characteristics of students who would be eligible for vouchers
under such a program. In these cases, and all subsequent cases, we assume
that vouchers are distributed to everyone in a school, so each aﬀected
school would face the prospect of losing its entire student body. We rank
schools according to the fraction of their students who qualify for a free
lunch, and then we present four scenarios in which increasing numbers of
students qualify. In column (4), for example, we show the demographic
composition of the voucher-eligible population if the two percent of chil-
dren attending the poorest schools were made eligible. This column shows
that under such a plan, 69 percent of qualifying students would be black, 95
percent would be eligible for a free lunch, and the average test score among
those students would be almost two standard deviations below the popula-
tion mean.
Moving across the next four columns, we see the impact of providing cov-
erage for larger fractions of the student population, who are attending in-
creasingly aﬄuent schools. As children attending schools with lower frac-
tions of poor students become eligible, the recipient population is less likely
to be poor and black, and the average recipient’s test score increases. When
students attending the bottom ﬁfth of schools are eligible, the average read-
ing score of the choice students is a full standard deviation above the aver-
age reading score of the students attending the bottom 2 percent of schools.
Average math scores are nearly two-thirds of a standard deviation higher.
These results conﬁrm that black students are disproportionately located in
low-income schools and that test scores and income are negatively corre-
lated, facts that are well established. It is interesting to note that changing
the income criteria and allowing more students to qualify has little impact
on the fraction of the eligible population that is Hispanic. This suggests that
Hispanics are more evenly distributed across school attendance areas than
are blacks, although the diﬀerence in Hispanic representation between the
ﬁrst and second columns still indicates that they are somewhat concen-
trated in poor schools.
In the eighth column of table 2.1 we present the characteristics of stu-
dents who would be choice eligible if the 44 percent of students attending
the lowest-income schools were provided with a voucher. We include these
results in order to provide a direct comparison with the student-based
voucher scheme presented in column (2). This column indicates that, rela-
tive to using eligibility criteria that are based on student income levels,
school-based eligibility criteria are much less eﬃcient at targeting low-
income children, at least when the fraction of students eligible for a voucher
is suﬃciently high. Whereas all of the children who receive vouchers under
the student-based system have low incomes, only 68 percent of the students
who receive vouchers under the school-based system have low incomes.
56 David N. Figlio and Marianne E. PageConversely, the school-based criterion produces a choice-eligible popula-
tion that has a higher representation of minorities. The higher representa-
tion of minorities is exactly what one would expect, given that high-income
blacks and Hispanics are more likely to live in poor neighborhoods than
high-income whites or Anglos. The average test scores of the targeted stu-
dents are remarkably similar under both eligibility schemes.
A comparison of columns (2) and (5) is more appropriate if vouchers are
randomly assigned to 5 percent of students (from among the income-
eligible population). Here we see that student-based assignment would
serve signiﬁcantly fewer minorities and that average test score performance
of the recipients would be substantially higher. To the extent that the
voucher population is nonrandomly selected from the eligible population
(as would be expected if eligible individuals need to apply for vouchers9),
diﬀerences between the two schemes would be more dramatic. Of course, a
student-based program that targeted the 5 percent of students with the low-
est incomes would undoubtedly produce stratiﬁcation eﬀects more similar
to those presented in the ﬁfth column.
2.3.2 Tying Voucher Eligibility to School Accountability
Voucher programs that are embedded within an accountability system
base eligibility on school test performance, rather than on individual or
school-level demographic characteristics. This section investigates the char-
acteristics of children who are eligible for school vouchers when eligibility
is determined by school performance. We consider several diﬀerent ways of
evaluating schools: Some performance measures are based on test score lev-
els, some are based on test score levels adjusted for demographic charac-
teristics, and some are based on value-added test scores. All of the perfor-
mance measures we present are based on reading tests. Our results are
trivially aﬀected by the use of math scores, or combinations of math and
reading scores that emulate Florida’s program.10
The ﬁrst type of performance measure that we consider is the school’s av-
erage test score in a single year. We rank schools according to their average
test score on the fourth grade FCAT reading test, and as in table 2.1 we
choose eligibility cutoﬀs according to whether choice is to be made avail-
able to 2, 5, 10, or 20 percent of the population. Schools can also be ranked
(and vouchers allocated) according to the fraction of students who attain
a particular competency level. This performance measure is closer to
Florida’s current school grading system.
A problem with these two measures is that they may penalize schools that
serve disadvantaged communities, since disadvantaged students do not typ-
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9. The available evidence on voucher experiments such as Milwaukee’s suggests that this
may be the case.
10. Results based on the other performance measures are available from the authors.ically perform as well on exams as their more advantaged peers. If the aim
of vouchers is to give choice to students attending poorly performing
schools, then it may be more appropriate to measure schools’ success using
test scores that take diﬀerences in student composition into account. There-
fore, we also consider the ramiﬁcations of a system that bases eligibility on
the school’s average test score after controlling for its demographic and in-
come composition.11 An alternative to regression-adjusting test scores for
the purposes of controlling for student body characteristics is to use value
added test scores. Two types of value added constructs are generally con-
sidered in policy discussions of accountability systems: measures of value
added constructed from changes in test scores from one cohort to the next
(within grade changes). As with the regression-adjusted levels method,
value added test scores net out school demographics, which may be a more
appropriate way of measuring schools’ eﬀectiveness. Value added test
scores are also popular because they are perceived to reward and punish
schools according to improvements or declines in quality over time.12
2.3.3 Voucher Eligibility under Diﬀerent Accountability Systems
The next four tables show how the population of voucher-eligible stu-
dents varies with the parameters of the accountability system. Each row in
tables 2.2–2.5 represents a diﬀerent method of rating schools, and the col-
umns indicate the size of the program (extending eligibility from 2 percent
to 20 percent of the state’s student population). Each table presents the re-
sults for a diﬀerent sociodemographic characteristic of the population:
Table 2.2 reports the fraction of voucher-eligible students who are free
lunch–eligible under each scheme, table 2.3 reports the average standard-
ized reading test score of voucher-eligible students, table 2.4 presents the
fraction of voucher-eligible students who are black, and table 2.5 presents
the fraction of voucher-eligible students who are Hispanic.
As table 2.2 makes clear, the socioeconomic composition of voucher-
eligible students varies dramatically across the diﬀerent accountability sys-
tems. When 2 percent of the population is made voucher eligible, the frac-
tion of eligibles who are also able to receive free lunch ranges from 44
percent to 89 percent, depending on which performance measure is used.
As the fraction of the population eligible for vouchers increases, the demo-
graphic variation across accountability systems falls somewhat, but even
when 20 percent of students are eligible the diﬀerence across the systems is
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11. An alternative, but very similar, approach involves regression-adjusting the school rank-
ing based on the fraction of the school’s student body attaining some particular threshold of
achievement.
12. Several authors have pointed out technical challenges associated with using test scores
for the purpose of school accountability and with constructing value added measures of school
productivity. See, for example, Clotfelter and Ladd (1996), Koretz (1996), Ladd and Walsh
(2002), Ladd (2001), and Meyer (1996). Some of these issues are summarized in Ladd and
Hansen (1999).substantial. The accountability systems based on level test performance
provide vouchers to a much more disadvantaged population than do ac-
countability systems based on regression-adjusted test score levels or value
added.
The patterns are subtly diﬀerent when students are stratiﬁed by their test
performance. These results are shown in table 2.3. As with income status,
the average standardized test score of voucher-eligible students increases
with the fraction of students eligible to receive a voucher. This is not at all
surprising, given that school grades are constructed using test scores. Also
comparable to the results shown in table 2.2 is the ﬁnding that value added
measures systematically produce a voucher-eligible population that has
higher test scores. Unlike in table 2.2, however, in this case we observe that
the more completely we control for school and student ﬁxed eﬀects, the
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Table 2.2 Percentage of Voucher-Eligible Students Who Are Free Lunch–Eligible under
Diﬀerent Accountability Scenarios
% of State’s Student Body Eligible 
for a Voucher
Accountability System
Basis of School Ranking 2 5 10 20
Average performance on fourth-grade  FCAT
reading examination 88.6 86.2 80.3 73.8
% of students achieving at least minimum 
competency on FCAT reading examination 89.1 86.9 82.3 74.4
Average performance on fourth-grade FCAT 
reading examination, adjusted for racial/ethnic 
composition and socioeconomic status in school 44.6 49.0 49.8 47.9
% of students achieving at least minimum 
competency on FCAT reading examination, 
adjusted for racial/ethnic composition and 
socioeconomic status in school 48.3 54.5 51.4 49.5
Cross-cohort changes in the average performance 
on fourth-grade FCAT reading examination 52.4 49.4 51.8 46.4
Cross-cohort changes in the average performance 
on fourth-grade FCAT reading examination, 
adjusted for racial/ethnic composition and 
socioeconomic status in school 55.0 52.0 52.9 50.1
Within-cohort changes in performance on the 
FCAT reading examination, from fourth grade 
to ﬁfth grade 60.6 57.1 53.6 49.8
Within-cohort changes in performance on the 
FCAT reading examination, from fourth grade 
to ﬁfth grade, adjusted for racial/ethnic 
composition and socioeconomic status in school 57.7 55.8 50.3 47.0
Notes: The numbers in this table reﬂect the percentage of voucher-eligible students who would be free
lunch–eligible in each of thirty-two diﬀerent voucher plans. Each row represents a diﬀerent targeting
scheme, and each column represents a diﬀerent level of voucher coverage.higher-performing are the resulting voucher-eligible students. Accountabil-
ity systems that use each student as his or her own control (the within-
cohort models) lead to a group of voucher-eligible students who perform at
nearly the same level as the overall population, whereas those that control
for only a few background characteristics lead to a group of voucher-
eligible students who are substantially higher performing than those con-
trolling for no background characteristics.
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present the results for race and ethnicity. We ﬁnd that
the patterns in table 2.4, reﬂecting the percentage of voucher-eligible stu-
dents who are black, closely mirror the patterns reported in table 2.2. This
is unsurprising given the high correlation between race and poverty status.
The patterns in table 2.5 are diﬀerent, however, and do not show a substan-
tial relationship between the construct of the accountability system and the
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Table 2.3 Average Standardized Reading Test Scores of Voucher-Eligible Students under
Diﬀerent Accountability Scenarios
% of State’s Student Body Eligible 
for a Voucher
Accountability System
Basis of School Ranking 2 5 10 20
Average performance on fourth-grade FCAT 
reading examination –2.69 –2.21 –1.84 –1.41
% of students achieving at least minimum 
competency on FCAT reading examination –2.59 –2.18 –1.80 –1.37
Average performance on fourth-grade FCAT 
reading examination, adjusted for racial/ethnic 
composition and socioeconomic status in school –1.55 –1.36 –1.16 –0.82
% of students achieving at least minimum 
competency on FCAT reading examination, 
adjusted for racial/ethnic composition and 
socioeconomic status in school –1.61 –1.45 –1.12 –0.84
Cross-cohort changes in the average performance 
on fourth-grade FCAT reading examination –0.99 –0.66 –0.65 –0.41
Cross-cohort changes in the average performance 
on fourth-grade FCAT reading examination, 
adjusted for racial/ethnic composition and 
socioeconomic status in school –1.07 –0.72 –0.69 –0.52
Within-cohort changes in performance on the FCAT 
reading examination, from fourth grade to ﬁfth 
grade –0.31 –0.20 –0.18 –0.11
Within-cohort changes in performance on the FCAT 
reading examination, from fourth grade to ﬁfth 
grade, adjusted for racial/ethnic composition and 
socioeconomic status in school –0.17 –0.16 –0.07 –0.02
Notes: The numbers in this table reﬂect the average standardized reading score of voucher-eligible stu-
dents in each of thirty-two diﬀerent voucher plans. Each row represents a diﬀerent targeting scheme, and
each column represents a diﬀerent level of voucher coverage.fraction of voucher-eligible students who are Hispanic. This ﬁnding is due
to the fact that Florida’s Hispanic students are considerably more aﬄuent
and less concentrated in particular schools than are Florida’s black stu-
dents.
Our ﬁnding that value added performance measures lead to a more ad-
vantaged voucher-eligible population is intuitive given that school quality
and changes in school quality are not the same thing. In fact, ceiling eﬀects
are likely to produce a negative correlation between test score levels and test
score changes: Schools with high average test scores in a particular year
cannot experience large test score gains from one year to the next, whereas
schools with low average test scores in a particular year have more room to
move up. Furthermore, Kane and Staiger (2000) show that value added
measures may be noisy signals of test score performance, leading to an ar-
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Table 2.4 Percentage of Voucher-Eligible Students Who Are African-American under
Diﬀerent Accountability Scenarios
% of State’s Student Body Eligible 
for a Voucher
Accountability System
Basis of School Ranking 2 5 10 20
Average performance on fourth-grade FCAT 
reading examination 71.0 67.6 59.1 51.4
% of students achieving at least minimum 
competency on FCAT reading examination 74.7 75.2 63.3 53.9
Average performance on fourth-grade FCAT 
reading examination, adjusted for racial/ethnic 
composition and socioeconomic status in school 31.1 32.2 31.3 28.1
% of students achieving at least minimum 
competency on FCAT reading examination, 
adjusted for racial/ethnic composition and 
socioeconomic status in school 30.1 34.4 34.0 30.1
Cross-cohort changes in the average performance 
on fourth-grade FCAT reading examination 28.5 27.3 24.4 24.9
Cross-cohort changes in the average performance 
on fourth-grade FCAT reading examination, 
adjusted for racial/ethnic composition and 
socioeconomic status in school 38.0 34.0 31.4 28.1
Within-cohort changes in performance on the 
FCAT reading examination, from fourth grade 
to ﬁfth grade 37.2 33.4 28.0 26.1
Within-cohort changes in performance on the 
FCAT reading examination, from fourth grade 
to ﬁfth grade, adjusted for racial/ethnic 
composition and socioeconomic status in school 38.1 36.3 30.6 26.6
Notes:The numbers in this table reﬂect the percentage of voucher-eligible students who would be African
American in each of thirty-two diﬀerent voucher plans. Each row represents a diﬀerent targeting scheme,
and each column represents a diﬀerent level of voucher coverage.bitrary assignment of school grades. We ﬁnd that the correlation between
the 1999–2000 test score change and the 1998–1999 test score change is ac-
tually negative (–0.33), suggesting that value added measures are failing to
pick up real changes in school quality.13
Kane and Staiger (2000) note that the noisiness of value added measures
is a more serious problem for small schools because the set of students over
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Table 2.5 Percentage of Voucher-Eligible Students Who Are Hispanic under Diﬀerent
Accountability Scenarios
% of State’s Student Body Eligible 
for a Voucher
Accountability System
Basis of School Ranking 2 5 10 20
Average performance on fourth-grade FCAT 
reading examination 21.9 26.0 28.7 29.2
% of students achieving at least minimum 
competency on FCAT reading examination 19.7 19.6 27.1 27.5
Average performance on fourth-grade FCAT 
reading examination, adjusted for racial/ethnic 
composition and socioeconomic status in school 14.6 19.6 20.7 18.9
% of students achieving at least minimum 
competency on FCAT reading examination, 
adjusted for racial/ethnic composition and 
socioeconomic status in school 18.5 20.4 18.0 18.9
Cross-cohort changes in the average performance 
on fourth-grade FCAT reading examination 29.6 26.6 31.7 24.3
Cross-cohort changes in the average performance 
on fourth-grade FCAT reading examination, 
adjusted for racial/ethnic composition and 
socioeconomic status in school 18.9 17.9 20.3 21.7
Within-cohort changes in performance on the 
FCAT reading examination, from fourth grade 
to ﬁfth grade 24.3 24.9 28.0 24.4
Within-cohort changes in performance on the 
FCAT reading examination, from fourth grade 
to ﬁfth grade, adjusted for racial/ethnic 
composition and socioeconomic status in school 17.5 17.7 18.8 20.1
Notes: The numbers in this table reﬂect the percentage of voucher-eligible students who would be His-
panic in each of thirty-two diﬀerent voucher plans. Each row represents a diﬀerent targeting scheme, and
each column represents a diﬀerent level of voucher coverage.
13. Our limited evidence also suggests that parents are able to tell the diﬀerence between the
information provided by test score levels versus test score changes. Using data from the
Gainesville, Florida metropolitan area and following the methodology used by Figlio and Lu-
cas (2000), we ﬁnd that level scores are more capitalized into housing prices than are value
added test scores, even when student demographics are taken into account. Similarly, families
in Gainesville request zoning exceptions to send their children to schools with high test score
levels at ﬁve times the rate of those requesting zoning exceptions to send their children to
schools with high value added.which test scores are aggregated is smaller. Consistent with Kane and
Staiger, we ﬁnd that a one standard deviation reduction in school size is as-
sociated with a 0.15 standard deviation increase in the absolute diﬀerence
between 1999–2000 value added and 1998–1999 value added. Kane and
Staiger’s ﬁndings, together with our own, suggest that although value added
test scores may at ﬁrst blush appear to be reasonable measures of school im-
provement, their use may actually undermine the goals of school account-
ability and vouchers.14
In summary, we observe considerable diﬀerences between the types of
students who are eligible for vouchers when voucher eligibility is based on
level test scores and the types of students eligible for vouchers when eligi-
bility is based on “purer” measures of school performance. Voucher awards
that are based on measures of school performance that do not take back-
ground characteristics into account tend to be better at targeting disadvan-
taged students than are voucher awards based on value added measures. We
conclude that, in voucher systems tied to school accountability, there may
be a disconnect between the appropriate ways of assessing schools for the
purposes of accountability and the desire to provide additional choices to
students who are arguably most constrained.15
2.4 Implications
Although many states were already considering school voucher pro-
grams and accountability systems, President Bush’s education proposal has
catapulted these school “fixes” into prime time. Even though only the
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14. One solution proposed by Kane and Staiger is to use “ﬁltered” test score estimates. Fil-
tered estimates use past relationships between test scores to optimally construct summary per-
formance measures. The summary measure includes weighted averages of current and past test
scores in multiple subjects, with the weights varying by school size. We have constructed a
crude ﬁlter by averaging both math and reading test scores over a two-year period (averaging
a total of four test scores) and then ranking schools according to cross-cohort changes in this
average. Our results diﬀer very little from those shown in the fourth rows of tables 2.2–2.5. This
suggests that although ﬁltered estimates may do a better job of capturing true changes in
school performance, using ﬁltered estimates to target vouchers will not necessarily aﬀect
which types of individuals end up qualifying. In other words, even if changes in school perfor-
mance can be measured accurately, using these changes to target vouchers will lead to a sub-
stantially diﬀerent population of voucher eligibles than a system that provides vouchers to stu-
dents in schools with low performance levels.
15. One might argue that sending a child to a low-performing school is evidence of con-
straint. For instance, high-income families with heavy debt loads may elect to send their chil-
dren to low-performing schools despite their “observed” ability to select a higher-performing
school. Although these families are surely less constrained than low-income households, this
should serve as an important caveat to our assertion that the “purer” the accountability sys-
tem, the least constrained are the households potentially oﬀered vouchers in an embedded sys-
tem. An alternative story would bias the conclusion in the other direction, however: If uncon-
strained households resettle in neighborhoods zoned for failing schools to take advantage of
school vouchers, as has been predicted theoretically by Nechyba (2000), this could exacerbate
the disconnect between the goals of school accountability and the goals of school choice de-
scribed in the paper.public school choice portion of the President’s proposal became law, the
struggle to improve school quality without increasing costs ensures that
these programs will be at the top of legislators’ agendas for the foreseeable
future. It is likely that, as in Florida, new voucher programs will be devel-
oped within the context of accountability systems.
At ﬁrst glance, it might seem appropriate for accountability systems and
voucher initiatives to go hand in hand. Both types of plans have been pro-
posed as a way of increasing school eﬃciency, and the rhetoric surrounding
both accountability and voucher discussions has particularly focused on
improving educational opportunities for America’s most disadvantaged
children. Our results suggest that a voucher program embedded within an
accountability system could fail to achieve this latter goal, however.
This interpretation of our results depends on one’s interpretation of what
it means to be disadvantaged. Economists usually promote voucher pro-
grams on the grounds that they increase school choice among individuals
whose mobility would otherwise be constrained. In these discussions, dis-
advantage is measured with the usual socioeconomic indicators (income
and minority status) because these characteristics are thought to have a
strong impact on an individual’s ability to move. The measure of disadvan-
tage that is inherent in an integrated voucher/accountability system, how-
ever, is whether the individual attends a poorly performing school. Because
school test scores are so strongly correlated with the socioeconomic back-
ground of the student body, and because much of the diﬀerence in outcomes
across student types can be attributed to family background, it makes sense
to base accountability on measures of performance that net out socioeco-
nomic factors or that measure growth in student test scores, rather than lev-
els of test performance. When vouchers are targeted this way, however, the
composition of choice-eligible children is vastly diﬀerent.
One can make a case that the students most deserving of vouchers are
those whose schools are doing the least to educate them, but there are sev-
eral reasons we believe that such a targeting scheme will be less successful
at helping the “truly” disadvantaged. First, because value added measures
of school performance are noisy, vouchers allocated in this way may bypass
many of the students attending the least eﬀective schools in favor of those
attending more eﬀective schools. Second, ranking schools according to
their performance net of socioeconomic characteristics necessarily ignores
the possibility of peer eﬀects. Although this may be appropriate for deter-
mining school performance, it could lead to an inaccurate assessment of
which students are being schooled in the worst environments and, thus, who
would most beneﬁt from receiving a voucher.
Like most economists, our third argument against basing voucher eligi-
bility on school eﬀectiveness is that such a targeting scheme will be less suc-
cessful at reaching the students whose schooling choices are constrained.
Our results indicate that choice-eligible children are much less likely to
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school performance (when eﬀectiveness is measured net of students’ family
background) than when it is determined using income criteria. If vouchers
are provided to students who are already able to choose private schools but
have elected not to, then they will accomplish very little.
Of course, important caveats accompany our interpretation of the simu-
lations. Foremost is the obvious point that if Florida’s distribution of stu-
dent types across schools is atypical, then the eligibility diﬀerences that we
have documented across targeting schemes may not be generalizable. In
particular, the eligibility diﬀerences will be less dramatic if, in other states,
low-income and minority students are more evenly distributed across
schools. Our results may understate the stratiﬁcation diﬀerences in states
where students are more concentrated by race, ethnicity, and income, how-
ever, as they appear to be in California and Texas.16
Another important limitation to our study is that we do not have infor-
mation on students’ income level, only on whether they are free- or reduced-
price lunch–eligible. Our results might look less dramatic if we were able to
see how the entire income distribution of voucher eligibles was aﬀected by
the various targeting schemes. Nevertheless, our ﬁndings suggest that edu-
cation policymakers should be very careful about articulating their goals
when designing voucher programs that are part of an accountability sys-
tem. In spite of their seemingly similar aims, it may be very diﬃcult to
achieve the goals of an accountability system and a voucher program in an
integrated system.
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